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The Meaning of Being and the
Value of Action for the Person
Bernard A. Gendreau

A basic question in dealing with the problem of Meaning and Action in the
context of a discussion centered around The Person, Action and Being-in-theworld is the respective role of the world and of the person in giving meaning to
action and the function of action in giving meaning to the world and persons. The
use of the world of nature or of the world of persons as paradigms or models for
our insights and judgments about the meaning of action could give us quite a different world-view than the use of action as the determining factor in giving meaning to thing in the world and to persons. The reality of the world, the worth of
person and the value of action will acquire different meanings according to the
perspective opted for .
Multidimensional man in seeking to achieve his own self-appropriation comes
face to face with a pluralism of philosophical approaches available to him. The history of philosophy offers man a great variety of possibilities for dealing with the
problem of meaning and action. A philosophy stressing in the classical tradition of
ancient, medieval and modern philosophy the object out there as a given to determine meaning and value involves a problematic and a philosophical synthesis which
are quite different from those implied in a philosophy stressing in the contemporary
trend the subject operating in the process of becoming. 1 Operating according to
being where what is proper is determined by the exigencies of the being gives a
foundation for meaning and value which is quite different from what would be the
case when what is at issue is being according to operating where what is proper is
determined by the conditions of the operating. Thus the person appears as a real
being with a nature specifying the properly human acts and reveals itself in being
real as an outcome of meaningful human acts. The source for meaning is different.
A colloquium on Meaning and Action which deals with the problem of meaning
and action from the point of view of behaviorism and pragmatism and of linguistic
analysis and existential phenomenology, which all have a common emphasis on
the subject operating as the basis for the meaning of being, the value of action and
the worth of the person (environment for behavior, project in doing, clarity in language and intentionality in consciousness), brings up the question of the possibility
of developing a new synthesis which would take into account not only the contemporary perspective of the subject operating to create meaning for the world and
persons from action but also the classical perspective of the object out there to find
a meaning in the world and persons for action. One wonders if using the contemporary insights of personalism and the classical insights of Thomism one could
develop a new synthesis which would make a contribution to the problem of mean-
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ing and action. How meaningful and viable would this Integral Personalist Philosophy be as an option in philosophy today?
The basic approach towards an Integral Personalism would suppose a philosophizing in history attitude considering that one's own primitive fact would more
or less find the various alternatives which have been tried in western culture still
alive as possibilities in spite of the radical criticism they might have been subjected
to. The presuppositionlessness in the approach would consist in taking the view
that no philosophical position which has shown itself to be viable at one time is
irretrievably lost in the realm of impossibilities. Old problematics and points-ofview can always be brought back to the fore to test their philosophical worth. One
of the characteristics of contemporary philosophy is that it develops ways of philosophizing which exist without coming into contact or facing confrontation with
other styles of philosophy.2 The actual co-existence of classical philosophies with
perspectives which are developed from a totally different context should be given
serious consideration.
The basic context of our discussion is the present day philosophical scene with
the basic about face that has taken place in the twentieth century as a result of
the crisis generated by three hundred years of modern philosophy and by the revolution in the methods of scientific inquiry.3 The critique of philosophy and the
critique of science at the beginning of the twentieth century led to a change over
from a scientific perspective concerned with the world as it is given as a bare fact
as an object by itself out there to a technological perspective concerned with the
world as it is worked over by man in the way it is and in the way it appears to man
in his knowledge. Hume and Kant have established us in a world of phenomena
without a knowable underpinning of intelligibility and ontology.4 Heisenberg,
Planck and Einstein as well as Mach have brought about the need for a more personal and a less absolutist view of scientific inquiry.5 The about face involved is
not so much a matter of bringing about new conceptions of reality in answer to old
questions and new opposing theories in the explanation of reality. What is being
changed is what one understands both philosophy and science to be all about.
Recent philosophy has established itself in this new world of inquiry in which
the object out there as a thing is not the main concern. This is true of the main
form of philosophizing such as pragmatism, phenomenology, linguistic analysis and
transcendentalism as well as of the other currents of philosophical thought. 6 Recent
scientific methodology continues this movement away from the primary role of
the object out there in the process of learning and the understanding of reality. The
impact of this methodological about face is well brought out in Thomas Kuhn,
Michael Polanyi, and Bernard Lonergan.?
The so-called revolt against classical formalism has left man without the basic
intelligible structure which constituted him in his being as a created thing having
its own essence as a predetermining given in his nature, its own powers as a means
of performing the activity which would help him complete himself and its own
existence through which the being of man is actually realized in the world of things
and has a relationship of dependence upon God and immortality. In certain places,

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol9/iss2/3
8

2

Gendreau: The Meaning of Being and the Value of Action for the Person
this characterization of man in his being might sound like science fiction or at most
a remembrance of things past. All this ontological content found in man is reduced
to a cipher or at least placed in bracket on the basis of the new exigencies of the
new learning. The operating becomes the ontological starting point and eliminates
the already given. This new learning is creating a new perspective for philosophizing which is proving to be most fruitful and meaningful for man as he seeks to be
himself by purifying himself and getting rid of all the old illusions about the meaning of being, the value of action and the worth of person, and by developing ways
of assuring for himself a proper way of operating in order to be at home with
himself.
Beginning with the Greeks, man, in western culture, started to develop an
objectivistic world-view to assure man a special place in the world. Greek philosophy started man on his long pilgrimage towards liberation from a reductionism
to the top which emphasized the value of reality in a world above, leaving the
world of things and of man with little meaning or value within being. The middle
ages appear as a long, hard and bitter struggle to overcome more fully this upward
reductionism by finding an understanding of reality through an ontological structure underlying the appearances of things and men and through an explanation of
beings through an ultimate creative cause above and beyond this world of our
experience. The core of reality found realized in each being and/ or the ultimate in
reality above man served as basis to justify the value, purpose and orientation of
human activities. The meaning of being established the value of action to give
worth to the person. Modern philosophy worked at undoing this ontological set-up
until it vanished into dark places from the affirmations of an absolutist rationalism
to the negations of an agnostic empiricism. Contemporary philosophy finding nothing left in man as an object out there to be looked at goes on trying to solve man's
problem often by attempts at various forms of reductionisms intended to free
man from his illusions about his autonomy as an ontologically constituted being
with freedom, dignity and worth. At the end, we find ourselves in a way, though
in a more sophisticated manner, at the original state of the Greeks prior to the
great build-up from Parmenides on. Man withou t the gods to plan his life will,
thanks to contemporary behaviorists, have social engineers do it for him in his
newly discovered situation as a reality beyond freedom, dignity and value. 8 Being
nothing in himself, man cannot be in his being and through his freedom the source
of his dignity and worth through the value and meaning he brings forth through his
actions. Yet he still remains a possibility of becoming all through outside forces
which constitute him in his reality.
The basic point is that instead of autonomous man, seen as under God or independent of God, we have here as in the other styles of contemporary philosophizing
the placing of man's hopes not in being as an object out there already endowed
with a value of its own as determined and determining, but in his operating as
the dynamism through which some reality will be achieved for him, whether
through his consciousness with authenticity as in existential phenomenology,
through his use of language in clarity as in linguistic analysis, through his process
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of thinking towards an horizon as in transcendentalism or through his activities
terminating in a project as in pragmatism. The personalist in line with this contemporary stance in philosophizing sees the being real of the person as the outcome
for man who becomes a person through reciprocity of consciousness and mutuality
in communion. Interpersonal and intersubjective relating of person to person in
awareness and in love assures the meaning for the being of man as personal and
communal.
Thus philosophizing in the contemporary context man as a subject operating
can now celebrate in the pursuit of new found opportunities available to him for
the taking hold of himself in a world without ontological roots in a substantial
world of determined essence and caused existence. The world makes a difference
for the person in its being and action. The world as environment becomes a basic
factor in explaining human behavior in its value and in determining the person
in its dignity. The world as a human context, instead of simply as a place in
which man exists and acts , might play a different role than the world as a
universe, the whole realm of reality, of which man is a part or an instance, be it
of a unique type. Using the world of nature as the model, as was done through
the centuries, man can be reduced to a nature manifesting itself through its
activity and determining the activity towards the realization of fulfillment
expected. Seeing the world as an environment man can be reduced to his human
behavior under the control of the environment under the guidance of the engineer.
The reciprocal involvement of man and his world gives meaning to both man and
his world. One wonders what role the meaning of being would play in a world
understood and functioning as nature coexisting with a world planned and
involved with behavior. Man as an object out there and man as a subject
operating might imply a different role for a being in its meaning as a being and
in value as operating. The world of things as well as the world of persons would
enter in determining the value of action and the worth of person. The problem
would b ecome the problem of the ontological difference action makes for the
person in the process of becoming real as a being and the pragmatic difference
being makes for the person actualizing its potential through activity.
The problematic of B. F. Skinner's latest book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity
could be uppermost in our mind when we encounter the problem of the meaning
of being and the value of action for the person in becoming meaningful through
its exercise of freedom and in achieving dignity through its promotion of worth. 9
Skinner's basic contribution to the problematic of man's development and survival
as a human being on earth would seem to be at least twofold: his emphasis on
the need of putting aside the assumption of the existence in man of an autonomous
man endowed with freedom, achieving dignity and pursuing value in order to
have man face up to the comprehensive role the environment has for his behavior
and his suggestion on the urgency of using, in a scientific age, the technology of
behavior to develop a behavioristic engineering project to preserve man from
destruction and disappearance. The problem to be resolved appears in its urgent
immediacy.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol9/iss2/3
10

4

Gendreau: The Meaning of Being and the Value of Action for the Person
Integral Personalism, flying as it would seem in the face of established facts and
scientific theories, suggests the importance of reemphasizing freedom, dignity and
value as the conditions for the promotion of man as a person and the survival of
man as a human being. In its existentialistic stance, Integral Personalism with its
emphasis on the person as conscious, free and creative might be more than willing
to play down and leave out autonomous man as a given with predetermining
intelligible make-up of essence, soul, powers and with an intelligible dependance
on a God causing being to be what it is , although it might hesitate to get involved
in a social engineering based on the technology leaving the whole process of
becoming to the environment and its controlling influence. The putting aside of
man as an object endowed with a nature and dependant on God is already
achieved in phenomenalistic empiricism and in phenomenological existentialism
and in many ways it is taken for granted in contemporary philosophical enquiry.
Integral Personalism might hesitate in its restatement of the ontological Thomistic
synthesis to do away with autonomous man with the implied determination fqr
the nature of man, his powers, the dependance on a creating God and the expectations from the immortality of the soul, although remaining open to the role of
other persons in the reciprocity of consciousness and the communion of love which
freel y and consciously entered into tends to a self-appropriation creating a meaning
for being to promote through value in freedom the person in dignity.
Thus while taking seriously Skinner's admonition to go beyond freedom, beyond
dignity and beyond value if we care for mankind and its future, it might be
prudent to consider seriously as another alternative the importance of reaffirming
the central role played by freedom, dignity and value whether within the objectivistic context of man as an object out there in the world or the personalistic
context of man as a subject operating in the world. The ,meaning of being, the
role of action and the worth of person would turn out to quite different in each
of the two perspectives, be it possibly with a meaningful complementarity. In
Integral Personalism, man as a being of option and as multidimensional seeks
self-appropriation through action. The primitive fact which develops into an
Integral Personalism perspective leads to an awareness that the meaning of being
in the person is determined differently and in a complementary way according
to the focal point of the human concern for the person in its being and its activity.
The person becomes real and acquires its proper meaning in being through
action either by achieving actualization of the given potential it has in its being
as having a human nature as principle of its activity or by creating the new
potential in the developing actuality it is in its being as a subject operating with
consciousness, freedom and creativity. In th e one case, the being is completing
itself as a person through activity on the basis of what it is in its essence and of
what it was expected to be according to its given potential. In the other case,
the being is becoming a person through its activity on the basis of the conscious,
free and creative involvement it lives with as a being in the world and with
other persons. Thus action has a basic role in the very creating of the meaning
the person is to have through action as it completes itself as a person with its
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own identity or as it becomes a person with its own authenticity. The problem
is to achieve meaning as it is called for already by the nature of the being and to
create meaning as it is not yet realized in the nature of the being. Action in its
value as the promoter of meaning for the person functions differently according to
the case. The synthesis coming out of the two perspectives is what is sought
after by Integral Personalism.
The project for the Integral Personalist would be to offer a comparative and
critical analysis of the classical object-minded perspective with person as being
(individual substance of a rational nature) and the contemporary subject-minded
stance with being as person (conscious, free, creative). Thus the determining of
meaning through praxis would be studied both in the context of the person as
an object out there living up to the common prescribed ideal according to its own
potential as an individual and in the context of person as a subject operating
setting out from its consciousness to be true to self according to what it has
made itself to be and is making itself to be. We should consider how the value
of action in the classical context 'depends on the meaning of being as an already
given reality and how the meaning of being in the contemporary context depends,
as not yet realized, on the value of action.
The meaning of being in what it stands for and in what it was to have been
determines, in the traditional scholastic philosophy, the value of action inasmuch
as the operation follows upon the essence and the operating follows upon the
existing. The value of action, in the contemporary existentialist philosophy, determines the meaning of being inasmuch as a being becomes what it is and what it
is to be as it is brought out and comes out through operation. In the first
instance, the intentionality of action appears to be a projection from the predetermining nature of the being involved as the given it was in its essence and
being to start with while, in the second instance, the intentionality in the action
appears as the project towards the being to be determined in its essence and
being. Integral Personalism seeks to discover the possibility of a complementarity
of the two diverging approaches and the possibility of a higher synthesis coming
out of the apparently conflicting existential situation created for the human condition by the difference in perspectives.
In the classical objectivistic context, man as a real being operating finds that
the value of his operating depends on the meaning of his being, in what it is as a
something and how it stands in relation to others in its existence. Man as he
is operating according to his being to be true to form achieves meaning for himself
as a person. As long as a man can know the meaning of being he can use this
meaning of being to determine the value of his actions. The order and the pattern
found in things determine the order or pattern to be established in the activity
of the being. The accidental reality of action with its value determined by what
is absolutely being as actually given in existence is the means for the person
which is only relatively good to start with to tend toward being absolutely good.
In the classical context, the issue, however, remains that the meaning of the
person acquired through action is not the only or primary determining factor for
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the value of action. Essence precedes existence and operation to determine their
value. But the uniqueness of the person depends on the meaning acquired through
action. The actualization of the potential of man is achieved according to the
manner proper to each man. Conscience as a knowledge about the order to be
established in action is both right according to the rule setting up the objective
norm for action and good according to the agent as the individual responsible
for his individual acts performed under the guidance of the universal exigencies.
Thus a predetermining factor is already determining through its meaning the
value of action, while at the same time the value of action is determining the
meaning of the person. The level of actualization achieved and the way of
achieving this actualization through action determines what a person stands for.
The unique meaning of person as person is added to the meaning of each person
as man. This type of objectivistic view of man has been subjected to strong
criticism both from the philosophical point of view and the scientific point of
view. While there might be a tendency to consider these criticisms leveled
against an objectivistic view of reality to be irrevocably decisive, there seems
to be the possibility of doubting their irretrievably damaging impact at least on
the basis that the context of their discussion might not cover all possible contexts
for discussion of the problem. Misunderstanding and misconceptions often can be
identified and especially the possibility of conceiving of the whole problematic
from a different point of view which would prove viable in spite the established
criticism should always be taken seriously into consideration. It is still worthwhile
to give this option a try, be it only that it might after all be the true insight for
man as man.
In the contemporary existentialist context where existence precedes essence
being depends for its meaning on action and action in a way depends on the
project brought out as an outcome for its value. With the about face in philosophizing which brought about the putting down of the object already out there approach
as predetermining the content and value of action, the value of action is determined by its openness towards what the action leads to and in a way by the
meaning the subject operating acquires in its being through action as a creator of
meaning and reality in the subjectivity of the subject operating. In the contemporary subjectivity approach, the subject operating acquires a meaning as a being
through his action as the action opens the subject operating to authenticity, to
clarity, to an horizon or to a project. Thus the value of action in phenomenology,
in linguistic analysis, in transcendentalism and in pragmatism is determined by its
influence in creating a being true to self having meaning in what he stands for.
The absurd man and the sane man have their meaning not through what was
already in them to create the absurd and the saneness but in the way through
action they face up to the absurd in the situation and to the clarity in the talk. What
the action reveals of what man is being made for instead of what a man was made
of determines in contemporary thought the meaning of being for the person. Being
real with a proper meaning in being is determined by the operating in the subject
present to his consciousness, using language, and in the process of thinking or
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doing. Thus the meaning of the being of the subject operating is determined in
contemporary philosophy by the praxis according to the type of praxis emphasized:
consciousness, thought, language or doing. Behaviorism with its emphasis on man
in his environment is also typical of the contemporary emphasis on praxis. Personalism with the centrality of man as personal and communal with reciprocity of
consciousness and mutuality of love offers new possibilities for man in his search
for self-appropriation. This contemporary way of becoming aware of the meaning
of the being of man suggests the viability of a philosophy taking into account both
aspects of man to put it all together. This is what Integral Personalism intends to
achieve by placing person at the center.
Xavier University
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